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The concept of place is ultimately a matter of ethical significance—of where 
something fits in a nexus or structure of meaning. Often this meaning is quite 
personal, involving a sense of presence we associate with a place. This essay 
investigates this connection through a study of Wordsworth’s poem, “Tintern 
Abbey.” It argues that the notion of a presence-infused place is ultimately that of 
a second-personal space. Presence is a matter of second-personal openness. 
Therefore, when presence infuses place, it makes its space second-personal also. 
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Introduction 
What is ‘place’? If I “can’t quite place you,” then I can’t recall where you fit in 
some larger history or narrative, whether my personal history or an account 
of some other kind. If I remember, say, where we met, spent time together, or 
last saw each other, I will have placed you, indeed, in some place, a location 
that has significance in my and our lives: “Oh right, we met at Olga’s party.” 
When people used to be said to know or not to know their place, what was being 
referred to was a location of an essentially social kind, a slot in a social hierarchy. 
This could be either the status location or the spatial locations to which that 
distinctive status was tied. When it was said that “a woman’s place is in the home” 
or “in the kitchen” that both referred to specific spatial locations and to the status 
location to which these were tied. It was “putting women in their place” both 
spatially and hierarchically. Of course, homes and kitchens are special places 
themselves, not by virtue of their spatial location alone, but because of how they fit 
in our lives, both individually and in common. 
 If we are trying to “place” a suspect at the scene of the crime, we are looking 
for some plausible account that might explain why she would have been there. If 
asked to list “public places,” we look to locations that have some public meaning, 
especially as “places to be,” like parks, plazas, squares, restaurants, and the like. 
Pick some random street crossing in Manhattan through which many regularly 
place, say Fifth Avenue and 47th St. Even if, on a given day, many more people go 
by that location than, say, Bryant Park, there is an obvious sense in which the latter 
is a public place and the former is not. Partly this has to do with the latter’s being a 
“destination,” partly its being a place where people spend time. But as with our 
other examples, what makes public places places is their significance in our lives. 
So let’s assume that place has to do with significance and meaning. Although, 
as we have seen, places can be significant locations in a variety of different 
frameworks, I will be concerned with place in a more “natural” sense. My subject 
will be places in nature, although these may have artificial aspects—human 
“effects” including those with social aspects.  
One example to which I will be returning is the area on “the banks of the Wye” 
River that Wordsworth writes about in his poem, “Lines Composed a Few Miles 
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above Tintern Abbey” (Wordsworth 2013).2 It is, of course, the “river,” “hills,” 
“mountains,” and “woods,” with which Wordsworth is primarily taken. But 
farmers’ “hedge-rows,” “pastoral farms,” “orchard-tufts,” and a “hermit’s cave,” are 
no less significant parts of Wordsworth’s landscape. 
A striking aspect of Wordsworth’s poem is what he describes as “a presence” 
he senses in the pastoral scene, from which he draws profound comfort and a “joy 
of elevated thoughts” (95-96). I want to explore what it might mean to sense 
presence in natural places. Wordsworth speaks not just of the natural or being in 
nature, but of “Nature,” as something that can be “loved and “worshipped”: 
“Nature never did betray the heart that loved her” and “I so long a worshipper of 
Nature, hither came” (122-123, 152-153). What, I want to consider, is the relation 
between these, between natural sites being places where it is possible to sense a 
kind of presence and their being appropriate objects of love and, even, worship? 
I want to begin by describing an experience I once had while running in a 
forest. It was in what is known as the Duke Forest in North Carolina, hardly 
wilderness, or even really suitable for what is usually called “trail running,” but 
woods bounded by residential and rural farming areas, crisscrossed by paths that 
are intended primarily for walkers. For whatever reason, it was deserted that day, 
and I had already run several miles. So I had something of an endorphin buzz and 
was already feeling in tune with the environment. The path was covered with pine 
needles to soften my step, the air was cool (not the punishing heat and humidity of 
the Carolina summer), and the sweet smell of the pines, and the sway and brush of 
their needles, brought me out of myself and my usual “non-natural” thoughts and 
filled my senses and mind with my natural surroundings.  
Out of nowhere, it seemed, a large running dog appeared. Not a wild creature, 
somebody’s Irish Setter, but without his owner, running on his own. He came right 
alongside me, and somehow we got into the same pace, matching each other’s 
stride. The dog wasn’t relating to me in ways dogs usually do with human beings, 
either barking, or looking for a petting hand, or anything. There seemed nothing 
he wanted from me or to express to me; he just seemed to want to run with me. 
                                                          
2. I am indebted to Molly Montgomery for a discussion of Wordsworth’s poem and the pronoun use in it for 
suggesting to me its usefulness in the present context. 
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And not, as it were, as a dog with a human, but just as one natural creature with 
another. At least, that was the way it felt to me. It was an extraordinary experience. 
Our running felt mutually energizing, drawing one another along in a way that felt 
like running in a pack of two. We went on for quite awhile, probably somewhere 
around a mile, and then, just as quickly as the dog had appeared, he took a different 
turn and was off.  
Obviously, this was memorable. It must have been close to forty years ago, but 
I remember it almost as if it were yesterday. What I remember most was the sense 
of mutual attunement and mutual presence. I don’t think I could express my 
feelings about it better than to say I felt “pure, unmitigated joy.” 
Presence as Second-Personal Space 
Recall Wordsworth’s identifying his sense of “a presence that disturbs me 
with the joy of elevated thoughts” (95-96). Later I will return to the 
connection between presence and joy in Wordsworth’s poem, and reflect on 
the nature of joy and the capacity of natural presence to inspire it. First, 
however, I want to pause to consider what presence itself is, beginning with 
the idea of someone’s presence. What is presence of this kind? And what it to 
be in it? 3 
Reflection on the etymology and meaning of ‘presence,’ the verb ‘present’, 
‘presentation,’ and ‘present’ (the presented offering or gift) is illuminating, 
extending also to ‘being present to’ someone, ‘being fully present’ in interaction. 
The first meaning of ‘presence’ given by the Oxford English Dictionary is: “The 
place or space in front of or around a person; the immediate vicinity of a person; 
the company or society of someone.” And then it adds, “frequently with reference 
to ceremonial or formal attendance on a distinguished, especially royal, person.” 
The first thing to notice, then, is that this ties the concept of presence to that of 
a person. To be in someone’s presence is to be brought somehow into awareness 
of and relation to him as a person, including awareness of his personage, if that is 
distinguished, like a king’s. 4 In The Second-Person Standpoint, I argue that person 
                                                          
3. The rest of this section draws heavily from Darwall, 2013. 
4. Cf. Erving Goffman on “co-presence” and “interaction rituals” in Goffman 2005: 1. 
11   The Journal of Ethical Reflections, 1 (4), Winter 2020-2021  
   
 
in this sense is a second-personal concept since it is understood within a network 
of concepts that involve the authority or standing to address (second-personally) 
legitimate claims and demands to others, along with the distinctive kind of reasons 
for acting they create (second-personal reasons) (Darwall, 2006). Locke says that 
“‘Person’ is a Forensick Term” (Locke, 1975: 346). To be a person is be an 
accountable moral agent to whom actions can be imputed. I argue that this is also 
P. F. Strawson’s point in “Freedom and Resentment” when he distinguishes 
between the “inter-personal” (or, as I call it, “second-personal”) perspective from 
which we regard, and implicitly relate to, one another as persons, holding ourselves 
answerable to each other through what Strawson calls “reactive attitudes” like 
resentment and moral blame, on the one hand, and an “objective” stance through 
which we view beings, even persons, in ways that neither imply nor insinuate 
interpersonal relationship (Strawson, 1968; Darwall, 2006).  
 ‘Presence’ is thus a second-personal notion. A presentation is something made 
by someone with requisite standing or presence to another in her presence, that is, 
to someone with the standing to receive it and in a way that involves a mutual 
acknowledgment of the respective standings of both parties. When the 
presentation is an offering of some kind, it constitutes a present. We say, “present,” 
when the roll is called, not just to register physical location, but in response. 
Someone is said to be more or less present as she is more or less a “second person” 
to one—actively relating, or open to it. And so on.  
Thus, if ‘presence’ is the “space around a person,” it is not a merely physical 
space. It is a normative space of second-personal interaction, configured 
differently depending on the specific authorities or standings involved. And we are 
present to one another when we are open to relating to each other second 
personally in ways that acknowledge our second-personal standings.  
In The Second-Person Standpoint, I argue that anyone who has the 
competence to be held, and to hold herself, accountable is a person with a basic 
second-personal authority that underlies mutual accountability. Morality, I argue, 
is the set of demands that persons legitimately make of one another and 
themselves, being therefore mutually accountable for compliance. 
More recently, I have been arguing that there are other forms of reciprocal 
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relating, involving standings to relate in their respective ways, that do not involve 
mutual accountability, but that nonetheless presuppose second-personal mutual 
responsiveness. Unlike deontic reactive attitudes, these presuppose no authority 
to hold people to account, but rather standings to relate reciprocally in non-deontic 
ways. Attitudes like trust and love, I argue, are “second-personal attitudes of the 
heart” in that through them we make ourselves personally vulnerable to others, 
open our hearts to them, and invite them to open themselves (and their hearts) to 
us in return (Darwall forthcoming a, 2017). When we trust someone, we implicitly 
invite them to trust us in our trust. And the attitudes that lovers and friends bear 
to one another implicitly invite the other to reciprocate and give the other standing 
in a personal relationship. 
Being in someone’s presence, therefore, means being in a space of second-
personal relating to them, whether deontically or non-deontically. This does not 
necessarily mean that mutual relating is always yet accomplished. But it does mean 
that some kind of openness and vulnerability is involved or in the offing. Sensing 
presence is not just having evidence that another is nearby. Presence is always 
ultimately to someone or some being, and we sense it by opening ourselves in some 
way to the being who is present it to us, even if the other is not aware of that. 
Presence and Heart in Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey” 
Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey” illustrates these connections between 
presence and second-personal space. The poet addresses the “sylvan Wye”: 
“thou wanderer thro’ the woods, How often has my spirit turned to thee!” (56-
57). It is next to the Wye that the poet feels “Nature”’s “presence” (95, 124-5). 
The poet describes the different relations he has had to the river and environs 
at different parts of his life. When he first “came among these hills” he “bounded” 
“like a roe . . . o’er the mountains” and along the river and streams. In these “boyish 
days” he enjoyed nature’s “coarser pleasures” and “glad animal movements.” To 
him, then, “mountain” and “wood” were “an appetite: a feeling and a love” (67-81). 
“That time is past,” now, and the poet returns after “a long absence” (84, 24). 
During intervening years, “the fretful stir unprofitable, and the fever of the world” 
have frequently “hung upon the beatings” of the poet’s “heart” (53-55). For 
consolation, the poet “oft, in spirit,” has “turned to thee” (the “sylvan Wye”) (58). 
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“Oft, in lonely rooms, and ‘mid the din of town and cities,” and “hours of 
weariness,” the poet has “owed” to his remembered Wye, “sensations sweet, Felt 
in the blood, and felt along the heart” (26-29). 
These consoling thoughts have given him “tranquil restoration.” But the poet 
also marks another “gift, of aspect more sublime” over the period that has passed 
since he was last by the Wye’s banks: 
. . . that blessed mood, 
In which the burthen of the mystery, 
In which the heavy and weary weight 
Of all this unintelligible world, 
Is lightened: --that serene and blessed mood (37-42). 
Returning now, he has “learned to look on nature, not in the hour of 
thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes the still sad music of humanity” (89-91). 
Wordsworth then describes his sense of a deep presence that, enables the poet to 
hold even the “still sad music” of human suffering because, as we might put it, that 
which is present holds him: 
I have felt 
A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man: 
A motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of thought, 
And rolls through all things (94-102). 
The “presence” “felt,” the “something” “sublime[ly]” “sense[d],” “dwells” both 
in natural places and “in the mind of man”. It is a “motion and a spirit” that impels 
all “thinking things” and “rolls through all things.” In this, the poet says, he 
“recognise[s]” “the anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse, the guide, the 
guardian of my heart, and soul of all my moral being” (108-112). 
Whereas in youth, Nature was the poet’s playground, it now provides him 
a consoling presence that enables acknowledgment of “the still sad music of 
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humanity” to which age inevitably exposes us while giving him a sublime sense 
of a “spirit” that is the source simultaneously of all natural and moral beauty. 
And this gives him joy.      
Presence and Spirit/Heart 
In this concluding section I want to reflect on the relation between presence 
and heart or spirit. We might begin with the two emotions that figure 
prominently in Wordsworth’s poem, joy and sadness. I would call both 
emotions of the heart or spirit. Joy gladdens our hearts and lifts up our spirits. 
And sadness can be heart-breaking and give us heartache, it turns out, not 
just metaphorically, but literally as well. 5  We also speak of sadness as 
“bringing us down” and lowering our spirits. 
Heart (in the nonliteral sense) and spirit are, of course, metaphors that are 
primarily delimited in relation to emotions like joy and sadness as the “place,” or 
perhaps places, where these emotions are felt. (Here again “place” is defined by 
meaning, in this case emotional significance in relation to the values to which 
emotions apparently respond.) Heart is perhaps associated more with our natural 
embodiment. When Wordsworth refers to the “sensations sweet” of his memories 
of the Wye during the absence after his playful youth, he says these are “felt in the 
blood, and felt along the heart.” It is then that they pass “even into [his] purer 
mind” (28-29). And the “presence” that on his return, “disturbs [him] with the joy 
of elevated thoughts” is of “a spirit, that impels all thinking things, all objects of 
thought” (95-101). 
To feel sadness and joy fully, we must open ourselves, our hearts and minds, 
and thus be present to that which makes us sad or joyful. But as presence is always 
implicitly reciprocal or second personal, this means that we do not simply take 
these emotions into ourselves in response. In opening our hearts and minds to 
these emotions, we also become emotionally vulnerable and so, at least when 
undefended, open to those in whose presence we find ourselves. What it is for a 
                                                          
5. “When we feel heartache, for example, we are experiencing a blend of emotional stress and the stress-
induced sensations in our chest—muscle tightness, increased heart rate, abnormal stomach activity and 
shortness of breath” (Emery and Coan 2010). 
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heart to be open is for it to be open to another heart. It is of the nature of heartfelt 
emotions like joy and sadness to seek expression to another with whom they can 
be shared. Joy and sadness naturally express themselves in song—a quintessential 
form of second-personal expression that is quite different from, for example, the 
sweaty palms or the churning stomach of anxiety or fear. 
In nature, whether along the banks of the Wye or in the Duke Forest, we can, 
like Wordsworth, have a “sense sublime of something more deeply interfused” that 
“rolls through all things.” The presences (or presence) we sense in nature share a 
common mutual responsiveness that runs through all life. Our very life’s breath, 
our literal “inspiration,” is a basic form of natural interaction that ends only with 
death. Even in death, Wordsworth says, “when the breath of this corporeal frame 
and even the motion of our human blood almost suspended, we are laid asleep in 
body,” we become, he says, “a living soul: while with an eye quiet by the power of 
harmony, and the deep power of joy, we see into the life of things” (44-50). 
Returning my mind now to the Duke Forest, I recall the profound sense of 
natural connection, presence, and mutual responsiveness in being part of a 
running “pack of two” with that Irish setter almost forty years ago. The joy I felt 
then was more like that of the young Wordsworth, the exuberance of our joint play. 
I run less these days, certainly not the “bound[ing]” “o’er mountains” of 
Wordsworth’s (or my) younger years. But neither am I quite ready to be “laid 
asleep.” Throughout it all I have been carried, like Wordsworth, by a joy born of 
memory of presence in natural paces, which makes it possible not to look away 
from “the sad music” of suffering, human and otherwise, but to hold it in the joyful 
sense of a deeper natural presence that holds us all.  
Conclusion 
I have been arguing that the idea of place is irreducibly ethical. It is not simply 
a geographical location, but a location in a structure or space of meaning and 
significance. Particularly meaningful places have a kind of presence, like that 
Wordsworth gives expression to in his famous poem about Tintern Abbey. 
With Wordsworth’s help, I have argued that presence is itself ultimately a 
kind of second-personal space, making presence-infused place second 
personal also. 
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